In "Belief Fonning Practices and the Social," Alston investigates the "social influences on individual cognition." Alston states, "I am a philosopher, concerned with epistemology ... hence ... 1 shall be concentrating on the conditions under which beliefs enjoy one or another epistemic status, realize one or another "epistemic desideratum"--being rational or justified, or qualifying as knowledge, to take the examples that have figured most prominently in epistemology" (p. 29). Alston develops three reasons for the reliability or unreliability of doxastic practices which he labels "grades of social involvement" (p. 48), arguing that social considerations are relevant to the epistemic status and assessment of individual beliefs (p. 49).
James C. Cox and Alvin I. Goldman, in their essay "Accuracy in Journalism: An Economic Approach," continue the work of Schmitt's introduction as part of their project to "define and develop a certain nontraditional sector of epistemology-a sector dubbed 'social epistemology'" (p. 189). This is carried through an analysis of the popular (American) news media.
In "Speaking of Ghosts," C.AJ. Coady examines Bradley's essay "The Evidences of Spiritualism" (1935) in a manner which is consistent with his book, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (1992) . Coady argues against a certain picture of our reliance on the word of others, which is explicitly acknow 1-edged as being derived from Hume (p. 77). Coady's account of spiritualist beliefs as well as those concerning the possibility of communication with alien species, both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial (p. 85), is intrinsically interesting. In concluding, Coady adopts a mitigated position on the question of reports of spirit land (i.e., bodily survival, etc.), claiming that those who do give credence to such beliefs cannot be accused of irrationality (p. 91).
Like Coady's essay, Longino's "The Fate of Knowledge in Social Theories of Science" is a modification and a defense of certain arguments outlined in an earlier book, her Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (1992) . She continues the project of this book in her attempt to "develop an analysis of scientific inquiry that both acknowledges the social dimensions of inquiry and keeps room for the nonnative and prescriptive concerns that have been the traditional preoccupation of philosophers" (p. 135). Longino devotes the majority of the essay to a rebuttal of Philip Kitcher's charge that she is gUilty of relativism and that as a result her account of science is incapable of distinguishing between evolutionary theory and creationism. Longino's counter-arguments attempt to establish a set of"discursive conditions for effective discursive interaction" and as a result to show that the nonnative content of "knowledge can be expressed within the tenns of a social theory of scientific knowledge" (p. 156).
Other contributions to the Schmitt volume include "Egoism in Epistemology" by Richard Foley, "Contrasting Conceptions of Social Epistemology" by Philip Kitcher, "Remarks on Collective Belief' by Margaret Gilbert and "A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology" by Hilary Kornblith. As a result, the collection of eleven essays contained within Socializing Epistemology has much to offer the epistemologist as well as those interested in sociology of knowledge. However, whether Schmitt has succeeded in his intention, namely the birthing of a new subject for philosophical analysis (social epistemology) is, ironically, dependent upon social factors which are themselves the subject of study of the authors of this volume. 
Reviewed by Douglas Walton
This pair of books are two volumes of an ongoing research project developing a new kind of formal logic The volume on propositional logics is the second edition of the book of the same title originally published by Kluwer (1990) . The book begins with an introduction to classical propositional logic, and then goes on to develop the new kind of logic. Both new volumes are presented very clearly from the ground up, in a text-book format, complete with exercises. And so both books, but especially the volume on propositional logics, could be used in a middle or upper level logic course, or a course on philosophy of logics.
The new logics are built around the idea that certain kinds of relations can be added into the requirements needed for the conditional (and for the other logical connective, where required). One kind of relation of this sort is generally called "relatedness". But what does 'relatedness' mean? Is it the same thing as 'relevance'? Epstein defines relatedness in various specific ways, many of which do seem to model kinds of relevance that would be of interest to the readers of Informal Logic.
For example, one way of defining relatedness is subject-matter overlap (vol. 1, p. 93). You can assign each given statement in your argument a set of subject matters, meaning a subset of a set of topics that the argument is supposedly about. So one proposition can be said to imply another in the new relatedness system if, and only if, the truth-values are the same as classical logic, and the two propositions do have subject matter overlap. For example,
